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Abstract
The telecommunications industry is often described as being a global industry. However, the fact
that it exists throughout the globe does not necessarily imply that its constituent companies are
individually global in their operations. So far, little interest has been expressed in determining
whether they are or are not in practice, but to do so requires that one ﬁrst determine how this is to be
measured. This article focuses on the measurement of internationalisation within the mobile
telecommunications industry where the phenomenon can be most clearly identiﬁed. Drawing on the
literature, four dimensions of internationalisation are initially identiﬁed and a database is
constructed for the year ending 31 December 2005 that provides hard evidence in relation to these
dimensions.
Analysis of the results reveals that just a handful of the companies in the sample can be considered
to be meaningfully international when all four criteria are taken into account, and that Vodafone
among them is best placed to describe itself as a global mobile operator although there are too many
reservations for the term global to be seen as an appropriate label. The results highlight the
complexity of internationalisation, with operators tending to do well on some of the criteria but not
on others, and the paper illustrates how data availability inﬂuences the choice of criteria. Data
availability also necessitates a trade-off between sample comprehensiveness and detail.
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1. Introduction
It is evident that the telecommunications industry is a global industry par excellence, not
simply because every country in the world boasts telecommunications networks of various
kinds but also because vast numbers of telephone calls and data streams originating in one
country are terminated elsewhere in the world. The global nature of the telecommunica-
tions industry has attracted the interest of a small number of researchers. For example,
Sarkar, Cavusgil, and Aulakh (1999) explored how market structure inﬂuenced
internationalisation while Chan-Olmsted and Jamison (2001) concentrated on the rivalry
that emerged between the global alliances that appeared at the start of the 1990s. Smith
and Zeithaml (1998) adopted a different approach by highlighting the relationship between
the domestic and international strategies of two Regional Bell Operating Companies, while
Fang, Fridh, and Schultzberg (2004) investigated why the proposed merger between two
Scandinavian incumbent operators failed. Largely overlooked has been internationalisa-
tion by the manufacturers of telecommunications equipment, though Steinbock (2002,
2005) has explored internationalisation from a standard setting perspective.
In contrast, this paper focuses on internationalisation within the mobile telecommunica-
tions industry. Unlike ﬁxed-wire communications, mobile telecommunications is a growth
sector and there are now more mobile than ﬁxed lines (ITU, 2003). As the mobile
telecommunications industry has grown, it has become an increasingly global phenomenon
with mobile services of some kind available in almost every country in the world. The
mobile telecommunications industry was initially highly fragmented, with service providers
being national in scope. Many service providers were also joint ventures that combined
local with foreign companies, with some countries reluctant to allow foreign control of a
strategic industry such as telecommunications. The regulatory barriers to entry that
fragmented the industry have been reduced, if not removed, through continued
liberalisation and de-regulation since the mid-1980s.1 Liberalisation and de-regulation
has been accepted to such an extent that most markets are now competitive (ITU, 2006).
Whilst such changes are undoubtedly wide-ranging in nature, a key component has been
the treatment of foreign investment. Bevan, Estrin, and Meyer (2004) found that in
transitional economies, foreign direct investment was positively related to the quality of
formal institutions while membership of the World Trade Organisation reduces the ability
of host countries to discriminate between domestic and foreign sources of investment
(Walden and Angel, 2005, p. 490). When taken together, these developments have largely
removed the barriers to entry that fragmented the telecommunications industry.
It is not clear, however, whether the structure of the mobile telecommunications industry
has changed as well. As only a handful of multinational service providers are identiﬁed by
the UNCTAD (2005), an inevitable question that arises is how many multinational mobile
operators exist? A second and related question is on what basis can such operators be
identiﬁed? As a consequence, this paper sets out initially to identify a range of
measurement criteria before commenting on the structure of the industry. To this end,
the following section details the different ways through which internationalisation may be
ARTICLE IN PRESS
1See, for example, Walden and Angel (2005) for a detailed discussion of telecommunications regulatory regimes
globally as well as within the UK and European Union. An overview of the liberalisation process on a global basis
in telecommunications as a whole can be found in, for instance, Braithwaite and Drahos (2000), Manner (2002) or
Zacher (1996).
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measured, while the third section describes the methodology we have opted to use. The
fourth section applies this methodology to the mobile operators that we have surveyed,
while the ﬁfth section explores which operator could be described as being the most
internationalised within our sample. In the ﬁnal section, the implications of our ﬁndings
are discussed and conclusions drawn.
2. Measuring internationalisation
There is no shortage in the literature of suggestions as to how internationalisation may
be measured. Do¨rrenbacher (2000) and Sullivan (1994) both suggest three broad categories
of possible indicators of internationalisation: structural, performance and attitudinal.
According to Do¨rrenbacher (2000, p. 120), structural indicators are those that provide a
picture of the international entanglement of a company at a given moment in time. One
example of such an indicator would be the number of countries in which the company is
present, while another would be foreign assets as a percentage of total assets. The ratio
between domestic and foreign employment is another structural indicator that is
sometimes used to measure internationalisation.
Performance indicators measure how well the company is doing abroad. Do¨rrenbacher
(2000, p. 120) identiﬁes two indicators—turnover and operating income—while Sullivan
(1994, p. 331) identiﬁes an additional three indicators: R&D intensity, advertising intensity
and export sales as a percentage of total sales. Although Gerpott and Jakopin (2005) prefer
the term ‘outcomes’ instead of performance, they also draw attention to foreign income as
a percentage of total revenue.
Attitudinal indicators focus on the relationship between the home country of the
internationalising company and its overseas operations. One measure is the amount of
international experience that senior managers have, while another is the psychic dispersion
of the international operations of a company (Sullivan, 1994, p. 332). One way to measure
international experience is simply to count the number of years that senior management
have lived abroad, though Do¨rrenbacher (2000) offers another, based on Perlmutter (1969)
who identiﬁed three different types of headquarter/subsidiary relation: ethnocentric,
polycentric and geocentric.
The notion of psychic distance was popularised by Johanson and Vahlne (1977). They
argued that internationalisation is incremental, with companies initially favouring those
countries that were closest to the home country before entering markets that were more
distant. Kogut and Singh (1988) describe a methodology that uses Hofstede (1980) to rank
countries relative to a given country. Perhaps a more straightforward way of determining
psychic dispersion is to use the ten zones identiﬁed by Ronen and Shenkar (1985).
Countries are grouped into ten zones on the basis of their attitudinal similarities.
A company with international operations in ﬁve of these zones would, according to
Sullivan (1994), have a psychic dispersion indicator score of 50 per cent.
The use of individual indicators provides an incomplete picture of internationalisation.
For example, a company may have a presence in 20 different countries but these may only
account for a fraction of its revenues or employees. As a consequence, some authors have
sought to develop composite indices of internationalisation that combine several hitherto
separate criteria. For example, Ietto-Gillies (1998) proposed a composite index that
combines the ratio of foreign to total assets, sales and employment with a measure of how
many countries the company could be present in if it so wished. UNCTAD (2005) divides
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these into two separate measures of internationalisation: a transnationality index (TNI)
and an internationalisation index (II). The former of these is the average of the ratio of
foreign to total assets, sales and employment while the latter is calculated by dividing the
number of foreign afﬁliates by the number of all afﬁliates. Although these indices are
intuitively attractive, it is worth noting that they do not control for country size. Hassel,
Ho¨pner, Kurdelbusch, Rehder, and Zugeho¨r (2003, p. 721) are not alone in arguing that
large companies from small countries will have a greater share of their activities overseas.
The inclusion of such companies will distort any index that is calculated.
Sullivan (1994) combines ﬁve different performance criteria with two structural and two
attitudinal measures into a composite index of internationalisation. The inherent
difﬁculties of identifying relevant measurement criteria, and then combining them into a
composite index, is illustrated by the subsequent exchange between Ramaswamy, Kroeck,
and Renforth (1996) and Sullivan (1996). Ramaswamy et al. (1996) argued that the
composite index proposed by Sullivan (1994) did not take into account the full complexity
of internationalisation, with Sullivan (1996) responding, predictably, that they had
misunderstood his original article.
Although the literature does provide a wide array of possible ways through which
internationalisation could be measured, some are easier to implement than others. In
particular, the availability of data inﬂuences which of the measures are feasible and which
are not. By no means do all mobile operators describe their international operations in
detail. As a consequence, it is often hard to determine the exact size of the investment or
how many subscribers the international operation has in any particular year. In addition,
the data can also be inconsistent between years, not least because operators restate their
accounts to reﬂect the sale and purchase of businesses. This complicates any attempt to
undertake a longitudinal analysis of internationalisation. One way to counter such
inconsistency is to opt for data that ar published regularly at both the individual
investment and parent company level.
The aggregation of data is particularly problematic. When data are aggregated by line of
business or geographical region, the performance of individual international investments is
obscured. For example, although UNCTAD (2005) identiﬁes France Te´le´com as being the
second-most-internationalised telco, its reliance on France and the UK for mobile
subscribers, and hence revenues, is hidden. Moreover, the choice of the parent company as
the unit of analysis will obscure the internationalisation of any telecommunications
subsidiaries. UNCTAD (2005) identiﬁes nine telcos as being among the top 100 non-
ﬁnancial transnational corporations, but two—Hutchison Whampoa and Vivendi
Universal—are overlooked and classiﬁed as ‘diversiﬁed’.
The performance of individual investments is also obscured when partially-owned
operations are consolidated with those that are wholly-owned. Financial data are
frequently aggregated and consolidated with the result that there is insufﬁcient detail to
determine the revenues and proﬁts of speciﬁc investments. DaXler, Parker, and Saal (2002)
and Gerpott and Jakopin (2005) are only able to conduct their ﬁnancial analyses of
operators because they limit their samples to American, European and Japanese
companies whose ﬁnancial reporting requirements are comparatively onerous and thus
provide relatively detailed data. The availability of ﬁnancial data highlights the choice that
needs to be made between being comprehensive on the one hand and being detailed on the
other. Although being comprehensive increases the number of companies included within
the index, and thus provides a better picture of internationalisation across the industry, it
ARTICLE IN PRESS
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does so at the expense of detail. In contrast, greater detail provides a richer understanding
of internationalisation but for fewer companies. In this paper, a more comprehensive
approach has been adopted. Through doing so, the analysis will include as many
internationalised mobile operators as possible and thus provide a fuller picture of the
industry’s structure.
3. Methodology
As a consequence of the limited global availability of data and the inherent inconsistency
of much of what is available, four measures of internationalisation are adopted here. The
ﬁrst of these is the number of countries in which the mobile operator has invested, while
the second is the psychic dispersion of these investments. Although Dunning (1993) and
Root (1987) among others demonstrate the range of potential entry models that are
available to an internationalising company, to be included in the country tally the presence
must involve an investment in an operational mobile telecommunications network. This
means that arrangements such as international roaming or brand franchising are excluded
as they do not provide a sufﬁcient degree of investment to merit inclusion. The third
measure is the number of proportionate subscribers, while the fourth is the dispersion of
those subscribers by region. These dimensions require clariﬁcation before we can proceed
on to describing the extent of internationalisation within the mobile sector.
To be included in the analysis, the internationalising mobile operator must be present in
at least three countries2—a term used here to encompass any areas such as islands or
territories that are self-governed and have their own telecoms licensing regulators. For
most of the 34 companies identiﬁed on this criterion, this includes its domestic country plus
at least two other countries. However, two of the companies—Investcom and Millicom
International—are based in countries in which they do not operate. Where the company
has multiple investments in the same country, only a single presence is recorded (although
the subscribers for all networks are aggregated). Subject to that proviso, each equity stake,
regardless of its size, is recorded as a single presence in a country. However, although each
is accorded the same weighting or status when determining the number of countries in
which a company is present, the size of the stake is adjusted for when calculating the
associated number of subscribers (see below).3 Furthermore, a presence is recorded only
when a network has been rolled out and is attracting subscribers; the mere acquisition of a
licence is not counted.
Determining the exact number of countries in which a company is present is complicated
by the use of holding companies in the telecommunications industry. It may be asked
whether, if an operator has invested in a holding company, this should be counted as a
ARTICLE IN PRESS
2This deﬁnition is necessarily somewhat arbitrary, but it would be equally arbitrary to draw the line at any other
number and three has the signiﬁcant merit of achieving a worthwhile size for the sample of countries under
consideration. As can be seen in Table 1, raising the threshold to four would only reduce the sample by two.
However, certain operators that technically reach the required sample size have been omitted: for example, SBC
Communications because its international assets are essentially via a 7.9 per cent stake in Ame´rica Mo´vil which
appears in the table and Russia’s Altimo because the ownership of some of its alleged assets are subject to ongoing
court cases.
3The size of a stake is a very unreliable guide to the associated number of proportionate subscribers, and hence
even very small stakes should not be excluded as is sometimes argued. For example, Vodafone’s 3.3 per cent stake
in China Mobile (Hong Kong) yielded 6.7 million proportionate subscribers in 2005.
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single investment or whether the holding company’s individual subsidiary investments
should also be included. The approach adopted here is to count all such investments as it is
generally impossible to determine the extent of any inﬂuence exercised by partners in a
joint venture and all may reasonably be assumed to be active partners unless they specify
that the holding is purely for investment purposes. The same principles apply to the
holding of stakes in other operators.4 Although it is possible to argue that a minority-
owned subsidiary of a minority-owned operator should not be counted as a country
presence due to the indirect nature of the stake, it may reasonably be counter-argued that
the strategy being pursued is precisely to gain a presence in a spread of countries via this
method rather than to attempt to buy direct stakes in tightly-held companies at exorbitant
prices.
Once the country presence of a mobile operator has been determined, it is then possible
to calculate its psychic dispersion. Ronen and Shenkar (1985) identify nine zones—Near
Eastern, Nordic, Germanic, Arab, Anglo, Latin European, Latin American, Far Eastern
and Independent. As these nine zones contain 46 countries between them, it is possible to
add a tenth zone—Other—that allows a company’s presence in all other markets to be
noted. The methodology proposed by Sullivan (1994, p. 340) for calculating psychic
dispersion can potentially be adopted with each zone equating to 10 per cent psychic
dispersion. As the intention is to examine the psychic dispersion of the international
operations of each of the mobile telcos, the home country should not be included in the
analysis. Thus, if the mobile telco has international operations in ﬁve out of the ten zones,
it would have a psychic dispersion score of 50 per cent.
The third dimension of internationalisation that we include in our analysis is the number
of subscribers controlled by a mobile operator. To be included within the analysis, the
company must control at least three million proportionate subscribers.5 At this point it is
accordingly necessary to differentiate between ‘gross’ and ‘proportionate’ subscribers.
Gross subscribers comprise all of the mobile subscribers to which a company can lay claim,
either in its domestic market or based upon it having an investment in a foreign operator.
As no account is taken of the size of the stake, the company simply claims all of the
subscribers generated by its various investments for itself.
In contrast, proportionate (or equity) subscriber ﬁgures do take into account the size of
the equity stake held. For example, if one telco owns a 50 per cent stake in another
company that has two million subscribers, the proportionate subscriber ﬁgure that it can
claim is one million. Since gross subscriber ﬁgures seriously inﬂate the number of
subscribers controlled by a typical mobile operator, and thus distort the size of its revenue
stream and proﬁtability, we have opted to use proportionate subscriber ﬁgures throughout
our analysis.
As noted, calculating proportionate subscriber levels is, however, far from straight-
forward. In the ﬁrst place, it is often unclear exactly how many subscribers a mobile
ARTICLE IN PRESS
4The obvious drawback to including indirectly-held stakes is that it superﬁcially involves an element of double-
counting—that is, the same subscribers end up being attributed to two or more operators. However, the purpose
of this paper is to examine the international operations of individual operators, not of operators as a whole, and
hence this drawback is not relevant.
5Although this number is necessarily arbitrary, it has one major advantage in that it avoids the problems of
making comparisons that would otherwise arise with operators such as Cable & Wireless and Digicel which have
large numbers of networks but where most of them yield very small numbers of proportionate subscribers.
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operator actually has, with the ﬁgure provided by the company often not agreeing with
that produced by regulators, consultancies and Internet websites.6 Wherever possible, a
company’s own ﬁgures are used, but in many cases recourse has been had to other sources
such as regulatory bodies. Related to this is a second complicating factor, namely that the
exact size of some equity investments is unknown due to the presence of contradictory
information in the public domain. In other words, it is not clear whether the size of the
stake held is X or Y per cent.7
A third complicating factor is the presence of holding companies. Not only does the
presence of holding companies ensure that another layer of ownership and subscriber data
needs to be identiﬁed, but it also gives rise to the temptation to assume, incorrectly, that
the holding company controls all of its subscribers. In practice, as Curwen (2005) notes,
this is not always the case. For example, Vivo is a Brazilian-based joint venture that is
owned 50/50 by Telefo´nica and Portugal Telecom. Hence, it is widely assumed that the
gross and proportionate subscribers of this joint venture should be equally divided between
the two parent companies. However, Vivo does not wholly own its various subsidiaries in
Brazil. As a consequence, the proportionate number of subscribers that either Telefo´nica
or Portugal Telecom could lay claim to in 2005 was signiﬁcantly less than the number
implied by a simple two-way division of the published subscriber numbers. A further
problem can arise simply from failure to specify whether it is holding company or
subsidiary that is being measured. Thus, for example, all mentions of Turkey’s dominant
mobile incumbent, irrespective of source, refer without fail to ‘Turkcell’. What is never
mentioned—usually because the writer is ignorant of the distinction—is that there is a
parent, Turkcell Holding, and a half-owned operating subsidiary, Turkcell. Readers are
evidently expected to know intuitively which is relevant.
Fourthly, around the turn of the millennium, several incumbent ﬁxed-wire telcos formed
specialised mobile subsidiaries that were subsequently part-ﬂoated on a stock exchange,
possibly as a means of creating value for shareholders or possibly to create a currency in
the form of the shares of the subsidiary that could be used to fund future acquisitions. One
such company was Telecom Italia Mobile while another was Telefo´nica Mo´viles. However,
when such companies were being formed, their parents did not necessarily transfer all of
their mobile investments to the specialised mobile holding company. As a consequence, the
mobile portfolio of the parent company often was, and sometimes still remains, larger than
that held by the subsidiary. This is recognised through our unit of analysis being the parent
company and not its mobile subsidiary.8
Once the proportionate subscribers for each of the 34 companies included in our analysis
were calculated, it was possible to re-work the ﬁgures so that the geographical dispersion of
ARTICLE IN PRESS
6By no means all companies provide subscriber data, and there is no universally accepted standard for reporting
subscriber numbers. For example, companies often differ in how long they count a subscriber as ‘active’ after
making or receiving the last recorded phone call or text message.
7Ownership of networks, especially in countries such as Russia, is a matter that is frequently brought before the
law courts. Partly for this reason—it is anyway strictly a ﬁnancial investor not a telco—Altimo (Alfa Telecom) has
been excluded. For companies used in the sample, all ownership data have been carefully cross-checked and
account taken of the position pending the outcome of any outstanding cases before the courts.
8This paper is, so far as we are aware, unique in adopting this approach. As it happens, the current popularity
of buying back ﬂoated shares in mobile subsidiaries—cf. France Te´le´com/Orange, Deutsche Telekom/T-Mobile,
Telefo´nica/Telefo´nica Mo´viles and Telecom Italia/TIM—means that NTT is now the only major operator with a
signiﬁcant public holding in its mobile subsidiary (although BT does not own one at all).
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subscribers was highlighted. Such an approach draws on the ‘triad’ analysis of Rugman
(2005) which examined the sales of the largest 500 multinational enterprises and concluded
that most multinationals are in fact regional and not globally focused. Recognising the
regulatory and commercial differences that occur across the global mobile telecommunica-
tions industry, seven regions were identiﬁed: Western Europe, Eastern Europe, the Middle
East, Asia, Central and South America, North America and Africa.9 The domestic
markets of each of the 34 companies covered in the analysis were also identiﬁed. Together
this enabled the percentage of proportionate subscribers accounted for by the company’s
domestic market and each region to be ascertained.
4. Internationalisation
The following sub-sections examine internationalisation within the mobile telecommu-
nications sector from four different perspectives. The ﬁrst sub-section concentrates on the
number of countries and regions in which the 34 mobile operators that we have identiﬁed
were present at the end of 2005, while the second sub-section focuses on the psychic
dispersion of these countries. In contrast, in the third and fourth sub-sections, the focus is
on the number of proportionate subscribers that each of the 38 companies controlled and
their distribution across the seven regions that we have identiﬁed.
4.1. Number of countries
Drawing on Table 1, it is possible to make a series of observations regarding the number
of countries in which mobile operators were invested at the end of 2005. The ﬁrst
observation is that the 364 entries are divided up in a somewhat unexpected manner10. One
would intuitively expect international operators to be found predominantly in the most
developed parts of the world and, in practice, Western Europe does loom large with 95
entries. By way of contrast, North America is largely the preserve of domestic operators—
only Deutsche Telekom has an independently-owned network. What is really surprising is
that Africa accounts for a further 88 entries, far more even than Asia. What this suggests,
inter alia, is that Asian operators prefer to stick to their own region11 while the large
number of African countries, combined with their general state of under-development, has
presented opportunities for telcos wishing to establish their international credentials.
The second observation is that whereas the 34 companies surveyed were collectively
invested in 364 countries, these investments were not at all evenly spread among the 34
companies. The most internationalised companies were Vodafone and France Te´le´com
ARTICLE IN PRESS
9The attribution of countries to regions is covered in the footnotes to Table 2. This is largely based upon simple
geography—for example, Egypt is allocated to Africa whereas it has been argued in private correspondence that
Egypt should be allocated to the Middle East on socio-political grounds even though this argument cannot strictly
be said to apply to areas south of Luxor. The issue of what is meant by ‘Europe’, and how it should be divided
between East and West, is becoming increasingly problematic, and many countries have recently had to be
switched from east to west, but for now, fortunately, the consequences of Turkey becoming an EU member state
need not concern us. Equally, a country such as Russia clearly falls into more than one geographic zone but it
would be far too complicated to divide it up between regions.
10For further details see Curwen and Whalley (2004).
11NTT DoCoMo was the only Asian operator actively to seek an international footprint outside Asia and its
tribulations overseas have done little to stimulate anyone else to follow suit although it is itself beginning to show
signs of renewed interest.
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Table 1
Presence in countries (31 December 2005)
Company Number
of
countries
Number of countries by region
Western
Europea
Eastern
Europeb
Middle
Eastc
Asiad Central and
South
Americae
North
Americaf
Africa
Vodafoneg 32 16 2 — 6 — 1 7
France Te´le´comh 27 11 2 1 1 2 — 10
Telefo´nicai 25 2 1 — 4 14 — 4
MTC (incl. Celtel) 18 — — 4 — — — 14
TeliaSonera 17 7 3 4 2 — — 1
Millicom International 16 — — — 4 5 — 7
Hutchison Whampoa 15 6 — 1 7 — — 1
Telenor 15 5 3 — 7 — — —
Tele2j 15 13 2 — — — — —
Ame´rica Mo´vil 14 — — — — 13 1 —
Deutsche Telekomk 14 8 4 — — — 1 1
Orascom 14 — — 2 7 — — 5
Etisalat 11 — — 3 — — — 8
MTN 10 — — — — — — 10
TDC 10 9 — 1 — — — —
Investcom 8 1 — 2 — — — 5
Portugal Telecom 8 1 — — 2 1 — 4
Telekom Malaysia 8 — — — 6 — — 2
NTT 7 — — — 7 — — —
OTE 7 1 5 1 — — — —
Singapore Telecom 7 — — — 7 — — —
Sprint Nextel 7 — — — — 5 2 —
Telecom Italia 7 1 — 1 — 5 — —
Turkcell Holding 7 — 2 4 1 — — —
Mobile TeleSystems 6 — 3 — 3 — — —
Alltel 5 2 — — — 2 1 —
Telekom Austria 5 3 2 — — — — —
Verizon Comms 5 1 — — — 2 2 —
Vivendi Universall 5 1 — — — — — 4
Vodacom 5 — — — — — — 5
O2 4 4 — — — — — —
VimpelCom 4 — 2 — 2 — — —
KPN 3 3 — — — — — —
SK Telecom 3 — — — 3 — — —
Total 364 95 31 24 69 49 8 88
aWestern Europe includes the 25 EU current member states plus residual Western Europe.
bEastern Europe includes the Balkans, Belarus, Moldova, Russia and the Ukraine.
cThe Middle East includes the Arabian peninsula, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Cyprus (N), Georgia and Turkey.
dAsia includes Kazakhstan, Australia and New Zealand.
eCentral and Southern America plus most of the Caribbean.
fNorth America constitutes Canada, Puerto Rico and the USA.
gNetwork Partnership Agreements are not included within Vodafone’s total.
hTrading mostly as Orange, a wholly-owned subsidiary. Those French overseas territories where Orange is
present are counted separately and not included within the total for France.
iTelefo´nica Mo´viles, a majority-owned subsidiary, owns and operates almost all of the networks.
jMVNOs are included in Tele2’s total as some investment is required before they can become operational.
kTrading mostly as T-Mobile, a wholly-owned subsidiary.
lPoland is not counted as Vivendi has recently been adjudged not to have legal rights to its claimed assets there.
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with a presence in 32 and 27 countries, respectively, while the least internationalised
companies were KPN and SK Telecom with a presence in three.
A third observation is that the 15 companies with a presence in at least 10 countries
collectively accounted for 253 of the 364 investments. It may also be observed that the top
ﬁve companies had a collective presence in 119 locations. In other words, the top ﬁve
companies accounted for almost one-third of the listed countries, and the top 14
companies for over two-thirds. It is worth noting here that the top three companies—
Vodafone, France Te´le´com and Telefo´nica—were present in signiﬁcantly more countries
than the fourth-ranked, MTC, which was present in just 18. However, it may be also noted
that Cable & Wireless had, inter alia, stakes in a large number of (mostly) small Caribbean
networks in 2005 but too few subscribers to qualify for the sample and that MTC only
operated six networks in 2004 so it appears to be closing fast on the top two.
A related observation is that the investments of a signiﬁcant proportion of the companies
were numerically concentrated in a single region at the end of 2005. Altogether, 17 companies
had two-thirds or more of their investments within a single region. Those companies which
had concentrated their investments in Western Europe were KPN, O2, TDC and Tele2, while
OTE was focused on Eastern Europe, NTT, Singapore Telecom, SK Telecom and Telekom
Malaysia on Asia, Ame´rica Mo´vil, Sprint Nextel and Telecom Italia on Central and South
America and Etisalat, MTC, MTN, Vivendi and Vodacom on Africa.
4.2. Psychic dispersion
It is immediately evident that the geographical basis for the allocation of networks used
in Table 1 does not accord all that closely with the concept of psychic dispersion which
groups countries according to their cultural afﬁnity, the argument being that companies
seeking to internationalise may well prefer to go ﬁrst to foreign countries that are culturally
close—that is, in the same zone—in order to learn how to operate overseas before moving
on elsewhere. Hence, the greater the number of zones in which they operate at any point in
time, the greater is the degree of internationalisation achieved. However, the 10-zone
division referred to previously is problematic when applied to mobile telecommunications
as only 46 countries are identiﬁed in the nine zones excluding ‘Other’, and only 22 of the 34
mobile operators listed in Table 1 are to be found with a home base among the 46, thereby
placing undue signiﬁcance upon the ‘Other’ zone. In view of this and the fact that Africa is
entirely absent from the list of zones, it is not surprising that virtually every operator
qualiﬁes for the ‘Other’ zone—the only exceptions are O2 and VimpelCom. Furthermore,
of the 22, seven are to be found with a home base in the ‘Anglo’ zone (three in the USA,
two in the UK and wo in South Africa).
That said, it is of interest to note from Table 2 that only two operators achieve a psychic
dispersion score above 50. The highest, at 80 per cent, is Hong Kong-based Hutchison
Whampoa, but this is partly accounted for by its unique strategy of seeking to be a new
entrant across a variety of zones via establishing third-generation (W-CDMA) rather than
second-generation (GSM) networks. Close behind comes Vodafone with 70 per cent,
although this appears to undervalue its international range of operations given that they
include the likes of China and Egypt.12 In joint third place are France Te´le´com/Orange and
ARTICLE IN PRESS
12Recent events suggest that any such undervaluation may not persist for much longer as, inter alia, Vodafone
has sold its network in Japan and is under pressure to sell its minority stake in US-based Verizon Wireless.
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Telefo´nica which score 50 per cent, but half of the scores are either 20 or 10 per cent—
scores which, given the standard entry in the ‘other’ column, effectively mean that there is
only a weak link with the previous work on psychic dispersion.
One factor reducing scores across the board is the virtual absence of entries in the ‘Arab’
zone. Only the two operators based in the zone, Etisalat of the UAE and MTC of Kuwait,
have non-domestic networks there. This reﬂects the fact that the countries within the
‘Arab’ zone are either closed to foreign direct investment or are too small to attract the
attention of an inward investor. There are also only three entries in the ‘Near Eastern’ zone
although this is set to grow with liberalisation. It is of interest that of the eight operators
with a psychic dispersion score of 40 per cent or more, the majority are present in the
Anglo, Far Eastern and Independent zones respectively and half in the Germanic, Latin
American and Latin European zones. Indeed, a surprising number of operators are present
ARTICLE IN PRESS
Table 2
Psychic dispersion (31 December 2005)
Total Anglo Germanic Nordic Near
Eastern
Arab Far
Eastern
Latin
American
Latin
European
Independent Other
Hutchison Whampoa 8 X X X X X X X X
Vodafone 7 X X X X X X X
France Te´le´com 5 X X X X X
Telefo´nica 5 X X X X X
Ame´rica Mo´vil 4 X X X X
Singapore Telecom 4 X X X X
Telecom Italia 4 X X X X
Telenor 4 X X X X
Verizon Comms 3 X X X
Deutsche Telekom 3 X X X
KPN 3 X X X
NTT 3 X X X
Orascom 3 X X X
Sprint Nextel 3 X X X
TeliaSonera 3 X X X
Alltel 2 X X
Etisalat 2 X X
MTC (incl. Celtel) 2 X X
O2 2 X X
Portugal Telecom 2 X X
SK Telecom 2 X X
TDC 2 X X
Telekom Malaysia 2 X X
Tele2 2 X X
Investcom 1 X
Millicom 1 X
Mobile TeleSystems 1 X
MTN 1 X
OTE 1 X
Telekom Austria 1 X
Turkcell Holding 1 X
Vivendi Universal 1 X
Vodacom 1 X
VimpelCom 0
Total 89 7 9 5 3 2 9 6 5 11 32
Note: Anglo ¼ Australia, Canada, Ireland, NZ, South Africa, UK, USA. Germanic ¼ Austria, Germany,
Switzerland. Nordic ¼ Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden. Near Eastern ¼ Greece, Iran, Turkey. Arab ¼ Abu-
Dhabi, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, UAE. Far Eastern ¼ HK, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines,
Singapore, S. Vietnam, Taiwan, Thailand. Latin European ¼ Belgium, France, Italy, Portugal, Spain. Latin
American ¼ Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Venezuela. Independent ¼ Brazil, India, Israel, Japan.
Other ¼ everywhere else.
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in at least one of the four countries that comprise the ‘Independent’ zone. Brazil and India
in particular have attracted foreign investment because they are large emerging markets
with substantial growth opportunities. The popularity of the ‘Other’ zone reﬂects the
widespread liberalisation of the telecommunications industry in general and mobile in
particular that has occurred in recent years. As a consequence, large swathes of Africa as
well as parts of Eastern Europe and Asia are now open to foreign direct investment.
A ﬁnal observation is that if we compare the number of countries identiﬁed in Table 1
with the psychic dispersion scores discussed above, a large country score does not
necessarily equate into an equally high psychic dispersion score (although it is the case that
three of the four operators with the highest dispersion scores are present in at least 25
countries). For example, KPN has a presence in three countries whereas TeliaSonera is
present in 17. However, because each of the three investments by KPN is to be found in a
different attitudinal zone while TeliaSonera has made multiple investments in the same
zone, their psychic dispersion scores are the same.
4.3. Number of proportionate subscribers
Table 3 shows the number of proportionate subscribers controlled by each company. In
addition, the table breaks down this ﬁgure by region. The table clearly highlights the large
disparities that existed at the end of 2005 in terms of the number of proportionate
subscribers controlled by each company, with the number controlled ranging from 179
million for Vodafone to under four million for Investcom. The 34 companies between them
controlled roughly 1.135 billion proportionate subscribers. On the basis of the substantial
variations that existed at the end of 2005, it is difﬁcult to argue that internationalisation by
mobile telecommunications companies is associated with any particular scale of operation.
Comparing the top 10 companies in Tables 1 and 3 is informative as several differences
can be observed. In the ﬁrst place, four of the 10 most-internationalised mobile telcos, as
measured by country presence, are not included in the top ten when the measurement
criterion changes to the number of proportionate subscribers. This feature would in
practice have been much more pronounced had there been no minimum requirement
placed upon the number of proportionate subscribers since Cable & Wireless and Digicel
operate in a large number of mostly small markets in the Caribbean.
Another company whose large geographical footprint is not reﬂected in its subscriber
numbers is Hutchison Whampoa. This is because it does not own any of the heavily
subscribed GSM networks in Western Europe having entered there fairly recently via the
3G licensing process. Conversely, there are two Russian operators and one American
operator that have large numbers of subscribers but cover only a few markets. Again, it is
worth observing that other major US-based operators such as BellSouth and SBC
Communications (joint owners of Cingular Wireless) as well as Verizon Communications
would have appeared in both columns in previous years but largely withdrew to their home
market during 2005.
4.4. Number and percentage of proportionate subscribers by region
Table 4 re-works the data contained in Table 3 above so that the evident regional
differences are highlighted. It is clear from the table that for many mobile operators their
domestic market provided a signiﬁcant number of their proportionate subscribers at the
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end of 2005, notwithstanding their internationalisation. For 14 of the companies listed, the
home market accounted for at least half of the proportionate subscribers that they claimed,
and for 10 among these the domestic market accounted for at least two-thirds of their
ARTICLE IN PRESS
Table 3
Proportionate subscribers by region (31 December 2005)
Company Total
subs
(millions)
Number of subscribers by regiona (millions)
Western
Europe
Eastern
Europe
Middle
East
Asia Central and
South
America
North
America
Africa
Vodafoneb 179.316 108.534 6.880 — 29.785 — 22.785 11.332
Ame´rica Mo´vil 92.635 — — — — 86.611 6.024 —
Deutsche Telekom 85.428 62.262 1.366 — — — 21.690 0.100
France Te´le´comc 71.946 57.627 6.966 0.264 0.01 1.522 — 5.555
Telefo´nicad 71.273 23.239 — — 0.006 46.829 — 1.199
Mobile TeleSystems 59.014 — 58.579 — 0.495 — — —
Telecom Italia 49.525 28.576 — 2.179 — 18.790 — —
Sprint Nextel 44.780 — — — — 0.493 44.287 —
VimpelCom 44.305 — 43.355 — 0.950 — — —
Telenor 42.599 7.293 21.064 — 14.242 — — —
Verizon Comms 37.203 5.470 — — — 3.251 28.482 —
TeliaSonera 35.778 12.370 10.353 11.498 1.262 — — 0.295
NTT 33.975 — — — 33.975 — — —
Singapore Telecom 30.698 — — — 30.698 — — —
O2 27.417 27.417 — — — — — —
Orascom 24.624 — — 0.894 14.218 — — 9.512
KPN 20.821 20.821 — — — — — —
Vodacom 20.123 — — — — — — 20.123
SK Telecom 19.423 — — — 19.423 — — —
MTN 18.294 — — — — — — 18.294
Hutchison Whampoa 17.176 9.789 — 0.652 6.735 — — 0.034
Portugal Telecom 16.327 5.312 — — 0.082 9.299 — 1.634
Turkcell Holding 15.484 — 0.749 14.515 0.220 — —
Vivendi Universal 14.351 9.300 — — — — — 5.051
Telekom Malaysia 13.845 — — — 13.704 — — 0.141
Alltele 11.931 1.024 — — — 0.245 10.662 —
Tele2f 11.061 8.413 2.648 — — — — —
TDC 10.026 9.987 — 0.039 — — — —
MTC (incl. Celtel) 9.340 — — — 4.010 — — 5.330
Telekom Austria 8.890 3.680 5.210 — — — — —
Millicom International 6.992 — — — 2.330 3.022 — 1.640
OTE 6.138 2.988 2.861 0.289 — — — —
Etisalat 5.733 — — 5.315 — — — 0.418
Investcom 3.751 0.065 — 1.452 — — — 2.234
aDeﬁned as per footnotes to Table 1.
bNetwork Partnership Agreements are not included within Vodafone’s total.
cThose French overseas territories where Orange is present are counted separately and not included within
France.
dTotal subscribers calculated through combining the proportionate subscribers derived from Telefo´nica’s equity
stake in Telefo´nica Mo´viles and then adding its own directly controlled subscribers to the total.
eIncluding Western Wireless.
fTele2 does not sufﬁciently separate its subscribers by country or line of business for an accurate breakdown of
subscribers by country to be undertaken.
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Table 4
Percentage of proportionate subscribers by region (31 December 2005)
Company Total subs
(millions)
Domestic
as % of
total
Percentage of subscribers by regiona
Western
Europe
Eastern
Europe
Middle
East
Asia Central
and South
America
North
America
Africa
SK Telecom 19.423 99.4 — — — 100 — — —
Sprint Nextel 44.780 98.5 — — — — 1.1 98.9 —
VimpelCom 44.305 97.2 — 97.9 — 2.1 — — —
Turkcell Holding 15.484 91.9 — 4.8 93.8 1.4 — — —
Alltelb 11.931 89.4 8.5 — — — 2.1 89.4 —
Vodacom 20.123 87.5 — — — — — — 100
NTT 33.975 86.1 — — — 100 — — —
Etisalat 5.733 78.5 — — 92.7 — — — 7.3
Verizon Comms 37.203 75.9 14.8 — — — 8.7 76.5 —
Mobile TeleSystems 59.074 74.9 — 99.3 — 0.7 — — —
Vivendi Universal 14.351 64.8 64.8 — — — — — 35.2
O2 27.417 58.3 100 — — — — — —
Telecom Italia 49.545 57.6 57.6 — 4.4 — 38.0 — —
MTNc 18.294 51.9 — — — — — — 100
Telekom Malaysia 13.845 49.5 — — — 99.0 — — 1.0
OTE 6.138 48.7 48.7 46.6 4.7 — — — —
Ame´rica Mo´vil 92.635 38.8 — — — — 93.5 6.5 —
KPN 20.821 38.8 100 — — — — — —
Telekom Austria 8.890 37.6 41.4 58.6 — — — — —
Deutsche Telekom 85.428 34.4 72.9 1.6 — — — 25.4 0.1
Portugal Telecom 16.327 32.5 32.5 — — 0.5 57.0 — 10.0
France Te´le´comd 71.426 31.4 80.0 9.7 0.4 0.1 2.1 — 7.7
Tele2e 11.061 28.0 76.1 23.9 — — — — —
Telefo´nica 71.273 25.8 32.6 — — 0.1 65.6 — 1.7
TDC 10.026 25.3 99.6 — 0.4 — — — —
TeliaSoneraf 35.778 19.3 34.6 28.9 32.3 3.5 — — 0.8
MTCg (incl. Celtel) 9.340 15.4 — — 42.9 — — — 57.1
Vodafoneh 179.316 9.1 60.6 3.8 — 16.6 — 12.7 6.3
Orascomi 24.624 8.4 — — 3.6 57.7 — — 38.7
Telenor 42.599 6.4 17.1 49.4 — 33.5 — — —
Singapore Telecom 30.698 5.3 — — — 100 — — —
Hutchison Whampoa 17.176 4.0 57.0 — 3.8 39.1 — — 0.1
Investcomj 3.751 0.0 1.7 — 38.7 — — — 59.6
Millicom Int’k 6.992 0.0 — — — 33.3 43.2 — 23.5
aDeﬁned as per footnotes to Table 1.
bThe company’s home market is the USA.
cThe company’s home market is South Africa.
dThose French overseas territories where Orange is present are counted separately and not included within
France.
eTele2 does not sufﬁciently separate its subscribers by country or line of business for an accurate breakdown of
subscribers by country to be undertaken.
fTeliaSonera’s home market is deﬁned as Finland plus Sweden.
gMobile Telecommunications Co.’s home market is Kuwait while Celtel is based in the Netherlands.
hThe company’s home market is Egypt.
iNetwork Partnership Agreements are not included within Vodafone’s total.
jThe company is based in Lebanon and listed in Dubai.
kThe company’s home market is Luxembourg.
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proportionate subscribers. There were even four operators whose domestic market
provided more than 90 per cent of their proportionate subscribers, while at the other end
of the spectrum there were two operators that did not operate at all in what was technically
their domestic market.
If we remove these two operators from consideration, then Hutchison Whampoa,
Singapore Telecom, Telenor, Orascom and Vodafone stand out as their domestic markets
account for less than 10 per cent of their proportionate subscriber base. In the case of
Hutchison Whampoa, Telenor, and especially of Singapore Telecom, this simply reﬂects
the small size of their domestic markets, but this is clearly not the case for Vodafone in the
United Kingdom. The UK accounts for 9 per cent of Vodafone’s proportionate
subscribers, with the remainder being spread across the rest of Western Europe (51.5
per cent), Asia (16.6 per cent), North America (12.7 per cent), Africa (6.3 per cent) and
Eastern Europe (3.8 per cent). While this does demonstrate that Western Europe provides
the majority of Vodafone’s proportionate subscribers, it also shows that Vodafone has a
substantive presence in at least two other regions, namely Asia and North America.
Vodafone’s presence in a further region, Africa, was superﬁcially quite small, but this fails
fully to reﬂect its 35 per cent stake in Vodacom of South Africa—raised to 50 per cent in
January 2006—which is growing rapidly.
Through an examination of the percentage of proportionate subscribers by region, we
can conclude that many mobile operators are in fact highly regional in their international
focus. For 20 out of the 34 companies detailed in Table 4, one region accounted for at least
two-thirds of their proportionate subscribers as follows:
 Western Europe: Deutsche Telekom, France Te´le´com, KPN, O2, TDC and Tele2. Eastern Europe: Mobile TeleSystems and VimpelCom.
 Middle East: Etisalat and Turkcell Holding.
 Asia: NTT, Singapore Telecom, SK Telekom and Telekom Malaysia.
 Central and South America: Ame´rica Mo´vil
 North America: Alltel, Sprint Nextel and Verizon Communications.
 Africa: MTN and Vodacom.
In every case, this region was also where they were headquartered.
A further issue to address is whether, if a large number of mobile operators draw their
proportionate subscribers predominantly from a single region, any of them had a
signiﬁcant presence in two or more regions. If drawing 20 per cent of the proportionate
subscriber base from a single region is taken as being a signiﬁcant presence, then 15
operators had a signiﬁcant presence in two or more regions at the end of 2005. Those
operators with such a presence were Deutsche Telekom, Hutchison Whampoa, Investcom,
Millicom International, MTC, Orascom, OTE, Portugal Telecom, Telekom Austria,
Telecom Italia, Telefo´nica, Telenor, TeliaSonera, Tele2 and Vivendi Universal. Only
Millicom International and TeliaSonera among these had a signiﬁcant presence in three
regions. However, for eleven of these operators a single region, which more often than not
was their domestic region, still provided more than half of their subscribers. It is also of
interest to note that Portugal Telecom and Telefo´nica drew more than half of their
proportionate subscribers from Central and South America and only one-third from their
domestic region.
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5. Identifying the most internationalised operators
In the previous section certain important dimensions of internationalisation have been
explored. As a part of this, attention has been drawn to the fact that the list of the ten most
internationalised mobile telcos as determined by the number of countries in which they
were present at the end of 2005 was not the same when the number of proportionate
subscribers was the measurement criterion. This was also the case when the percentage of
proportionate subscribers outside the mobile operator’s domestic market was used.
Table 5 lists the top 10 operators according to the various criteria discussed above.
Drawing on Table 5, it is possible to identify three mobile operators that appear among the
top ten companies on all of the criteria, namely Telefo´nica, Telenor and Vodafone while
Ame´rica Mo´vil, Deutsche Telekom, France Te´le´com, Hutchison Whampoa, Orascom and
TeliaSonera appear in three columns. The ﬁrst observation that we can make is that since
Vodafone has a higher ranking than Telefo´nica and Telenor on four and three of the
criteria, respectively, it must be deemed to have been the most internationalised operator in
the mobile telecommunications sector during 2005. Nevertheless, with roughly 60 per cent
of its subscribers coming from the West European region, no subscribers at all in two of
the seven regions, a now much reduced presence in Asia and with negotiations ongoing to
sell out in the USA, it nevertheless takes something of a leap of imagination before
Vodafone can be deemed to be a truly world-wide operator.
The rank order beyond Vodafone is rather more contentious. Whereas Telefo´nica is not
overly dependent upon its home market, it effectively operates in only two regions with
Spain providing the great bulk of its European subscribers and Brazil the bulk of the
remainder. Hence, while it has recently been actively seeking to expand its horizons,
especially with the purchase of O2, its proﬁle remains bi-regional. Meanwhile Telenor is a
ARTICLE IN PRESS
Table 5
The most-internationalised mobile operators at 31 December 2005a
Rank
order
Number of countries Proportionate
subscribers
Percentage of proportionate
subscribers outside the
domestic market
Psychic dispersion
1 Vodafone Vodafone Hutchison Whampoa Hutchison Whampoa
2 France Te´le´com Ame´rica Mo´vil Singapore Telecom Vodafone
3 Telefo´nica Deutsche Telekom Telenor France Te´le´com
(3 ¼ )
4 MTC France Te´le´com Orascom Telefo´nica (3 ¼ )
5 TeliaSonera Telefo´nica Vodafone Ame´rica Mo´vil (5 ¼ )
6 Hutchison Whampoa
(6 ¼ )
Mobile TeleSystems MTC Singapore Telecom
(5 ¼ )
7 Telenor (6 ¼ ) Telecom Italia TeliaSonera Telecom Italia (5 ¼ )
8 Tele2 (6 ¼ ) Sprint Nextel TDC Telenor (5 ¼ )
9 Ame´rica Mo´vil (9 ¼ ) VimpelCom Telefo´nica Deutsche Telekom
(9 ¼ )
10 Deutsche Telekom
(9 ¼ )
Telenor Tele2 Orascom (9 ¼ )
Orascom (9 ¼ ) Sprint Nextel (9 ¼ )
TeliaSonera (9 ¼ )
aExcluding Investcom and Millicom International which have no subscribers in their home markets.
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much smaller operation and only operates in three regions, so its appearance in all four
columns is deceptive. Clearly, although not bi-regional, it is not far off that description
given the proximity of its West and East European investments.
For its part, France Te´le´com is present in six regions, which would be an impressive
result were it not for the fact that it is so dependent upon a single region for its subscribers
(and hence fails to make the list in column three). As an aspiring world-wide operator it
has much to thank for its colonial past, but in subscriber terms it is really tri-regional with
no presence in North America and only rather minor networks in several other regions.
Furthermore, it is unlikely to make major new investments in the near future. Ame´rica
Mo´vil appears in the same three columns, which is impressive for an operator based in
Latin America, but it is effectively a one-region operator with a big domestic market, so
once again its multiple appearances in Table 5 are deceptive. That leaves Hutchison
Whampoa, a company whose telecommunications holdings are undergoing radical
restructuring. These holdings are growing rapidly due to the long-awaited explosion of
3G subscriptions, mainly in Italy and the UK. However, needing to fund its huge
investments in 3G, and having hived off most of its non-European assets into Hutchison
Telecom International (HTIL), it subsequently sold a ﬁfth of HTIL to Orascom and hopes
to conduct IPOs in India, Italy and the UK. At the end of the day, therefore, its position in
Table 5 is somewhat deceptive because its domestic market is so small and it remains
essentially a bi-regional operator, albeit one with a much more laid-back attitude than
other operators about moving into markets where it has little psychic afﬁnity.
The fact that two major West European incumbents, Deutsche Telekom and Telecom
Italia, are less prominent may be viewed as surprising. In the latter case, however, this
reﬂects a conscious strategy of concentrating upon the very large markets of Italy, Brazil
(where it now intends to sell out) and Turkey while selling its non-core networks. Deutsche
Telekom is a more interesting case because it has recently exited the high-growth market of
Russia, declined to bid for O2 and its CEO stated in August 2005 that it was ‘not actively
seeking new acquisitions, but we will continue to evaluate new opportunities which arise
within our existing footprint’.13 Clearly, this is hardly the proﬁle of a company with global
ambitions. Finally, TeliaSonera, the only European operator that was the product of a
merger, performs well and only just fails to qualify in all four columns. However, although
it has operations in a commendable ﬁve regions, its subscribers are almost equally divided
between just three of them so it is clearly a classic tri-regional operator.
6. Conclusions
It is ﬁrst necessary to comment on the database employed above. There is, in principle, a
case to be made for also including ﬁnancial measures of internationalisation. However, it
has been possible to analyse 34 companies in this paper and if ﬁnancial measures were to
be included the sample would be substantially reduced both in total and geographic spread
as not all of the sample companies publish data at the required level of detail. This is also
true of those measures that look at, for example, the proportion of domestic to total
employees. While the inclusion of such measures would further our understanding of
internationalisation in the mobile sector, it would do so at the expensive of
comprehensiveness. In other words, our understanding of internationalisation would be
ARTICLE IN PRESS
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P. Curwen, J. Whalley / International Business Review 15 (2006) 660–681676
Au
th
or
's 
  p
er
so
na
l   
co
py
furthered in a limited number of cases—predominantly based in Europe and the USA—at
the expense of not being able to discern broader trends within the industry. The need to
include ﬁnancial measures of internationalisation would, for example, exclude many of the
mobile operators based in the Middle East and Africa and, as a consequence, the
emergence of a new type of internationalising mobile operator, namely, one based in a
developing country and investing in other developing countries, would be downplayed or
perhaps even overlooked altogether.
Secondly, it may be noted that no attempt has been made to calculate a single measure
of internationalisation even though, in principle, it would be possible to meld together the
rankings shown in Table 5. A composite index could be constructed that equally weights
the four dimensions of internationalisation that have been discussed. A numerical value is
given to each company equal to its rank in the table, with a lower value equating to a
greater degree of internationalisation. If such an approach is adopted, the resulting index
identiﬁes Vodafone as the most internationalised operator. However, as two subscriber
dimensions are included in the index a better approach may be to equally weight country
presence, psychic dispersion and subscribers. Again, the lower the score the greater is the
degree of operator internationalisation. Recalculating the index on this basis conﬁrms
Vodafone as the most-internationalised operator, with the gap between Vodafone and
France Te´le´com, the second-most-internationalised, being more or less the same as in the
ﬁrst index. Alternatively, it may be more appropriate to weight country presence as being
more important than subscribers, which, in turn, is more important than psychic
dispersion.14 Psychic dispersion is given the least weight in the index to reﬂect its lack of
geographical coverage when compared to those countries that now allow some form of
foreign direct investment in their mobile telecommunications industries. Recalculating the
index produces much the same results although the gap between France Te´le´com and
Vodafone is less than in the previous two cases.
The gap between Vodafone and France Te´le´com ﬂuctuates because the weights pick up
the respective strengths of the two companies. The three sets of weights noted above are
arguably equally valid insofar that they reﬂect different understandings of internationa-
lisation. The ability to suggest alternative weights, or to critique the three suggestions
made, requires a detailed understanding of the telecommunications industry. This is also
true for the data collection that underpins the various dimensions of internationalisation.
As the construction of a sector-speciﬁc index requires a high degree of specialised
knowledge, problems may arise in both its development and subsequent use. In other
words, the replication of a sector-speciﬁc index is not straightforward even when the
relatively simple measures of internationalisation adopted here are used. The inclusion of
additional dimensions is likely to serve only to complicate the data collection and index
construction process.
Having said this, it is possible to include additional dimensions into the analysis through
techniques such as factor analysis. Hassel et al. (2003) apply such a technique to their
sample of German multinationals, though they argue that the ‘real’ and ﬁnancial indices
that they construct measure distinct aspects of internationalisation.15 Moreover, they
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conclude that combining such indices together into a single measure of internationalisation
would distort any ranking that emerges. As the ﬁnancial rewards from internationalisation
in telecommunications are dependent on ﬁrst acquiring a country presence and then
proportionate subscribers, they are not aligned in time. That is, there is a generally lengthy
lag between entering the market via a licence acquisition or, indeed, via a takeover
(because of regulatory issues) and the accruing of ﬁnancial rewards. Thus, a single measure
would under- or over-emphasise internationalisation depending upon how the lag is
incorporated into the index.
Despite these reservations, the study has led to some interesting conclusions. It is often
claimed that telecommunications is a global industry in the sense that companies operating
within it have a global presence. Through examining the degree to which internationalisa-
tion within the mobile telecommunications sector has occurred, this paper challenges such
an assertion. Close examination of individual operators demonstrates that most are bi-
regional at best and that even Vodafone cannot claim to have a world-wide presence other
than in the limited sense of coverage via roaming agreements.
The fact is that even experienced operators like Vodafone have struggled in some mobile
telecommunication markets. The range of uncertainties that mobile operators face is
highlighted by Sanchez-Peinado and Pla-Barber (2006), who identify three broad
uncertainty categories: host country, demand and behaviour. In Japan, Vodafone
struggled to understand the market. In part, this was because senior management were
drawn from outside the country with the consequence that they did not fully understand
the market, and in part because Vodafone was also present in the less familiar ﬁxed
telecommunications market. In addition, Vodafone also failed to appreciate some of the
technological characteristics of the market. This was particularly evident in respect of
handsets; Vodafone’s attempt to introduce European-style handsets proved to be
unpopular with consumers and resulted in it losing market share to its rivals (Williams,
2006). Thus, there are clear limits to the standardisation of information and communica-
tion technology products to which Gabrielsson and Gabrielsson (2004) draw attention.
Vodafone’s foray into Japan vividly illustrates that what works in one market may not
work in another. Vodafone has implicitly acknowledged the differences that exist between
markets by highlighting a set of core European markets—Germany, Italy, Spain and the
UK. The challenge for Vodafone in these markets is to increase the revenue that it extracts
from each subscriber, whereas the challenge in markets where the level of mobile uptake is
much less, such as those in Africa or India, is to grow its subscriber base. One way through
which Vodafone may increase revenues in its core European markets is through improved
co-ordination of its national subsidiaries so that, for example, best practice is transferred
from one market to another. There is undoubtedly some co-ordination across Europe; for
example, common services have been introduced, although at present it is not clear
whether or not this has led to improved ﬁnancial results. The use of a common brand may
also have encouraged roaming, a traditionally lucrative source of revenue, but this has
come under investigation by the European Union in recent months (Laitner, 2006;
Vodafone, 2006). The challenges that Vodafone faces have stretched its management team
to the full, which, when coupled with apparent internal differences has led some
shareholders to call for change (Edgecliffe-Johnson & Burgess, 2006).
Managerial disagreements within telecommunications companies are nothing new.
Many of these stay behind closed doors, with only a handful coming into the public
domain like those at Vodafone. More common are disputes between joint venture
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shareholders such as that at VimpleCom, where major shareholders Telenor and Alfa
differ over the strategy to be adopted. Tensions between the two shareholders have been
inﬂamed by alleged conﬂicts of interest on the part of Alfa, whose inﬂuence on the
VimpelCom board has also led to a decline in its corporate governance rating (Telenor,
2006). A failure to resolve these differences could see Telenor sell one or more of its
Eastern European networks, which given that they collectively account for half of all its
proportionate subscribers would represent a substantial change in strategy on its part.
However, this should not be taken as suggesting that disputes only occur between
companies originating from countries that are culturally quite distant. Although Telenor
(Norway) and Telia (Sweden) are based in countries that are culturally close, cultural
factors did contribute to their failure to agree on merger terms (Fang et al., 2004).
The analysis has also highlighted that really acquisitive operators appear to be
emerging—and this is a very recent phenomenon—from the Middle East and Russia.
There are arguably parallels with the international expansion of US-based operators in the
1990s, but if so the auguries are not too good. MTC, for example, has stated that it is
pursuing a ‘3 3 3’ strategy—a 9-year, three-phase plan that will see it progress from
being a regional to international and ultimately global operator. However, acquiring a
relatively small regional specialist such as Celtel is not a strategy that can be repeated as a
route to global status and there is the issue, as Etisalat found when over-bidding for
Pakistan’s PTCL, of affording such a strategy even for those with oil riches and domestic
monopolies. It may be noted that no Chinese operators are included in our sample,
primarily because they have devoted their energies so far exclusively to their domestic
market and also because, as was demonstrated when China Mobile tried unsuccessfully to
acquire Millicom International (Guerrera & Reed, 2006), they are not necessarily welcome.
Faced with this new phenomenon, managers in countries that have traditionally
provided the impetus towards internationalizing the sector must decide whether to
compete or not. In practice, this is not much of a choice either because domestic exigencies
are dictating strategies—such as in the USA where domestic restructuring is absorbing all
available management time and one obvious way to raise the requisite capital is to sell non-
core holdings overseas—or because the ﬁnancial markets are unwilling to ﬁnance new
international adventures.
It is somewhat ironic that this is happening at precisely the point in time when balance
sheets have been restored to order after the meltdown of 2002 and 2003, but management
would do well not to repeat the ‘growth is good’ mantra of the late 1990s. By and large, a
solid, defensive and inward-looking operation is what the ﬁnancial markets currently
favour, at least until the implications of many of the new threats/opportunities such as
ﬁxed-mobile convergence, mobile TV and voice over Internet protocol (VoIP) have
worked their way through the system. However, it must be acknowledged that since the
threats are initially impacting ﬁxed-wire operations, the temptation to compensate by
seeking to acquire additional mobile holdings despite inﬂated prices is going to remain a
temptation for some time to come.
Finally, drawing on the reservations noted above, it is possible to suggest two areas for
further research. One such area is that of psychic dispersion and how it can be
implemented so that the widespread liberalisation of telecommunications that has occurred
is reﬂected in the countries covered by the measure. At the moment, too many countries
fall into the ‘Other’ category with the consequence that the degree of internationalisation is
misrepresented. Geographical coverage could be broadened through applying the
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suggestions made in Shenkar (2001). A second area of further research is to identify which
ﬁnancial measures are available across the industry. The substantial variation that
presently exists in ﬁnancial reporting between countries, limits the extent to which ﬁnancial
criteria can be included in any index. While fewer companies could be included in the
index, this does limit the degree to which observations can be made regarding
internationalisation at the sector level. Thus, further research should attempt to identify
an appropriate ﬁnancial measure that can be used across the sector.
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